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Abstract: 
In this article, we develop a standard short-run Kaleckian 
macromodel. First, we study the stability of equilibrium and make 
some comparative static exercises. Then, we take into account 
different specifications for an endogenous propensity to invest and 
systematically analyze the short-run dynamics of the model. We show 
that when firms’ managers adopt abnormal behaviours due to 
pressures from shareholders regarding the propensity to invest the 
system exhibits persistent cycles and chaotic trajectories. The analysis 
emphasizes that, even in the short-run, shareholders may generate 
instability which represents a serious threat that should not be 
underestimated for a capitalist economy. 
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1. Introduction∗ 
A large range of studies concerning the theory of endogenous business cycles exists in the 
economic literature. Macroeconomic models relating the cyclical dynamics of capital stock 
and global income have been developed initially by Kaldor (1940), probably one of the first 
economists to realize the importance of non-linearity. This model has been extended and 
updated by, among others, Chang and Smyth (1971), Semmler (1987) and Grasman and 
Wentzel (1994). In the same optic, persistent fluctuations have also been discovered in the 
more standard scope of the IS-LM model as in Schinasi (1982) and Day and Shafer (1985). In 
these theoretical frameworks, ad hoc nonlinearities contained in the investment and saving 
equations are the main cause explaining the appearance of cycles or chaos. 
This article adopts a slight different approach than the previous analyses. In our approach, 
nonlinearities appear more naturally through the existence of an endogenous firms’ propensity 
to invest. To the best of our knowledge, little attention has been paid to this variable despite 
its fundamental role on the economic activity. For instance, a variable propensity to invest 
may allow us to assess the capability of stockholders to influence the investment decision-
making process. The aim of this paper is to show that abnormal behaviours from firms, 
leading, by extension, to abnormal values of the propensity to invest, are able to modify the 
stability of a simple neo-Kaleckian macromodel, extending to short-run dynamics the 
conclusions yet obtained in the long-run by Post-Keynesians researches (on this point see, for 
example, Charles, 2008a). 
In this paper, a systematic analysis of this propensity to invest is done by proposing three 
different theoretical models. Consequently, the outline of the paper is as follows. First, we 
present the main assumptions and the structure of a nearly standard neo-Kaleckian model in 
discrete time with a constant propensity to invest. We also study the short-run stability 
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conditions by making use of a simple phase diagram. Second, we extend this approach by 
endogenizing the propensity to invest. Here, we deal with two different views; the first refers 
to normal behaviours from firms whereas the second is intended to represent abnormal 
behaviours, often due to shareholder pressures on managers. This allows us to show a large 
variety of dynamics. It turns out that abnormal behaviours may lead to the appearance of 
persistent cycles and chaotic trajectories even in the short-run. In the final section, we draw 
some conclusions. 
 
2. A neo-Kaleckian model with a constant propensity to invest 
We start by assuming a closed economy without government economic intervention that 
may be represented through a short-run macromodel. Global demand is not enough to ensure 
full capacity utilization of capital and labour. In this article we shall not deal with price 
flexibility, leaving this concept for future research or to existing contributions (see Lima and 
Meirelles, 2003; Asada, 2004). The division of national income is: 
Π+= wLpY                                                             (1) 
where Y  the national income, w  the nominal wage rate, L  the employed quantity of labour 
and Π  the level of gross profits. Firms, operating in an imperfect goods market, set price 
according to a standard mark-up rule on exogenous unit-labour costs: 
wlmp )1( +=                                                             (2) 
with 0>m  and 0>l respectively standing for the mark-up and the constant labour-output 
ratio. We immediately see that the amount of profits is .mwL=Π  Some simple manipulations 
of equations (1) and (2) give the profit share in nominal income 10 << pi : 
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Hereafter, to keep things simple, we shall assume that .1=p  The profit rate r  is the 
proportion of profits in nominal capital stock. Following the usual disaggregating method 
contained in heterodox analyses (Taylor, 1983; Lavoie, 1992; Lima and Meirelles, 2006) the 
macroeconomic profit rate is: 
piu
YK
Y
K
r =
Π
=
Π
=                                                      (4) 
where u  the output-capital ratio is a proxy for the rate of capacity use.  
Turning our attention to saving behaviours, we have the quasi-complete saving function, 
including differentiated propensities to save, previously utilized in several Post-Keynesian 
macromodels (see, among others, Charles 2008b): 
]))(1[()(/ ididrssidrsKSg fcfs +−−+−==                                  (5) 
We postulate the existence of three agents: firms, capitalists and workers. Firms save a 
portion, ,10 << fs  of their net profits, ,idr −  and capitalists a portion, ,10 << cs  of their 
revenues including distributed dividends, ),)(1( idrs f −− and interest receipts from firms, .id  
Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that workers as a class do not save, so their 
expenditure is exactly equal to their wage income, ,WC =  explaining why they do not appear 
in expression (5). 
As for the investment function we adopt the following simple form: 
)(/ idrsKIg fd −+== βα                                                 (6) 
Equation (6) is mainly based on the level of net retained earnings and on a positive parameter, 
,α  representing animal spirits. Here, β  represents the sensitivity of accumulation to net 
retained profits (also called propensity to invest). We already know that internal available 
funds represent a variable of great importance in heterodox Keynesian models as shown by 
the empirical works of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and Ndikumana (1999). This 
section dealing with a constant propensity to invest, we have 0>β  that represents our normal 
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case and, by extension, normal behaviours from firms. However, in the following sections, we 
shall try to analyse what happens with an endogenous propensity to invest, admitting that 
managers adopt abnormal behaviours under the pressure of stockholders. In this article, 
expression (6) focuses exclusively on internal resources, leaving the analysis of capacity 
utilization or the direct effect of interest rate to more sophisticated developments (see Lavoie 
and Godley, 2001-2002). For instance, the introduction of a capacity effect in the investment 
function would have not change the results obtained in terms of dynamics, only adding a 
major degree of complexity to our presentation. Finally, remaining in the short-run, the level 
of indebtedness is assumed to be constant. 
Replacing r  by its value from expression (4) into dg  and sg  and assuming a growth rate 
equilibrium on the goods market, we find the following equilibrium value for the rate of 
capacity utilization with an exogenous propensity to invest: 
)]1()1([
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~
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                                                (7) 
Then, introducing (7) into (4) gives the macroeconomic rate of profit: 
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and (8) into (6) the rate of accumulation: 
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                                             (9) 
A quick inspection of these expressions indicates that the denominator is always positive 
whatever the different propensities of the model. Furthermore, the numerator of (7) and (8) 
must be positive to be economically significant, which is not the case for the level of 
investment that can be negative, at least in the scope of short-run dynamics. In line with the 
Post-Keynesian theory of income distribution, we know that capitalists have a high propensity 
to save, ,cs  so we may be sure that .0)1( >−+ βcs  
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Concerning short-run stability and recalling that this economy is operating with excess 
capacity, we assume the standard Keynesian adjustment mechanism according to which 
output, through the rate of capacity utilization, changes with excess demand on the goods 
market. So, we have the following difference equation: 
)(11 stdtttt gguuu −=−≡∆ ++ ϕ                                                 (9) 
Hereafter, for simplicity, we assume that, ,ϕ the speed of adjustment between investment and 
saving is equal to unity. Introducing (8) into (5) and (6) and the corresponding expressions 
into equation (9) we find: 
{ } tfcfcft usssidssu )]1()1([1])1([1 −+−−+−+−=+ βpiβα                      (10) 
Mathematically, the stability condition for a linear first order difference equation implies that 
1/1 <∂∂ + tt uu  (see Shone, 2002), which gives: 
0)1()1(1)]1()1([1 >−+−⇔<−+−− fcffcf ssssss ββpi                    (11) 
Economically, convergence is ensured in Kaleckian models if investment is less sensitive to 
variation in capacity use than saving ( tsttdt ugug ∂∂<∂∂ // ). This condition holds in our model 
since the denominator of (7) and (8) is always positive, as established above. Recalling that 
,0)1( >−+− idss cf βα  a simple phase diagram also shows that u~  is an attracting stable 
fixed point (see Figure 1). 
 
Here Figure 1 
 
A further step consists of making some comparative static exercises, indicating the effect of 
a variation in animal spirits, the interest rate, the level of indebtedness or the capitalists’ 
propensity to save. Consider a rise in the level of animal spirits as represented by the 
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parameter .α  This can be associated with more optimistic expectations about future economic 
conditions. Then, the rate of capacity use and profits increase due to a rise in investment.  
Other experiments show that increasing indebtedness or the rate of interest has a negative 
effect on .~u  We know that a higher interest rate (or debt) reduces the level of investment 
through the cash flow effect contained in equation (6). Nevertheless, a higher i  also increases 
capitalists’ consumption by providing them a surplus of income. Here, the former effect is 
greater than the latter since capitalists’ propensity to spend, ,1 cc sc −=  is relatively small, 
implying that an increase in i  or d  has a negative impact on capacity utilization and profits. 
The next step consists in assessing the variation in the capitalists’ propensity to save out of 
income. Some simple calculations unambiguously show that an increase in cs  has a negative 
effect on economic activity (see Figure 2). This conclusion is in line with standard neo-
Kaleckian model of growth and distribution. 
 
Here Figure 2 
 
Another interesting result is that a fall in the propensity to invest diminishes the rate of 
utilization, through its negative effect on investment as shown by equation (6). To us, such a 
change means that firms adopt a less cautious behaviour by neglecting safe internal finance.  
The last exercise indicates that our model is stagnationist in essence. This means that a rise 
in the real wage, implying a fall in the share of profit, causes an increase in the rate of 
capacity use. The explanation is the following: a rise in the real wage redistributes income 
from firms and capitalists, with a small propensity to spend, towards workers with a 
propensity to spend equals to unity. This generates a positive economic effect due to the rise 
in consumption demand, emanating from workers. Note that a different specification of the 
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investment function may change the stagnationist behaviour of an economy as shown in 
Badhuri and Marglin (1990) and Blecker (2002). Our main results are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Here Table 1 
 
In the following section, the main novelty regards the introduction of a variable propensity 
to invest in the previous short-run macromodel. Then, we shall deal with two different 
theoretical constructions. The first refers to normal behaviours from firms, the second 
incorporates abnormal behaviours due to stockholders pressures. 
 
3. Short-run dynamics in the normal case 
To the best of our knowledge, no authors deal with an endogenous propensity to invest, 
except Delli Gatti, Gallegati and Gardini (1993) and Delli Gatti, Gallegati (1994), though not 
in a Kaleckian framework. Hereafter, we explicitly follow their studies by assuming that the 
propensity to invest is procyclical. To avoid useless complexity we assume the linear relation: 
tt uu 0)( βββ ==                    00 >β                          (12) 
This positive causality is based on the well known study of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988). According to them, the global propensity to invest, ,0β  is a weighted average of the 
high propensity to invest of small firms (with high rate of growth of sales) and of the small 
propensity to invest of big firms. Therefore, during an economic expansion small firms grow 
more quickly than big firms which leads to an increase in their weight and in the global 
propensity to invest. Introducing the new expression for β  into (10) we have: 
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where .02,1,0 >=iε  Computations indicate that equation (13) is a hyperbolic curve in the 
tt uu /1+  plan with an inflexion point 02/)1( 21 <−= εεu (see Figure 3): 
uuuu ttt <
>⇒<
>∂∂ + 0/1                                                 (14) 
 
Here Figure 3 
 
Potentially, two equilibria exist, however we shall not deal with the unstable one since it is 
located, for plausible values of parameters, beyond the maximum logical value .1=u  Indeed, 
assuming a positive shock 10 >u  would have no economic meaning. Assessing dynamic 
trajectories, after a variation of parameters, is now more difficult due to the presence of 
nonlinearities. To overcome this difficulty we perform simple numerical simulations, 
adopting a standard presentation that shows systematically the phase diagram and the 
corresponding dynamics through time. For the set of initial parameters given in Table 2 and 
assuming a strong negative shock, ,2.00 =u  Figure 4 establishes capacity use at .67.0~ =u  
 
Here Table 2 
 
Here Figure 4 
 
Here Figure 5 
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Other experiments in Figure 5 show that a fall in the capitalists’ propensity to save 
)6.0( =cs  tends to increase the rate of capacity utilization, since it generates a rise in demand 
emanating from capitalists. Furthermore, simulations (see Figure 6) indicate that a permanent 
decrease in the parameter 0β  also diminishes output. With 5.00 =β  the rate of utilization, ,~u  
goes down from 0.67 to 0.61, keeping intact the whole conclusions made in section two for the 
model with an exogenous sensitivity to cash flows. In what follows, we shall examine 
whether abnormal behaviours from firms, by changing the propensity to invest, are able to 
modify the stability of this short-run Kaleckian macromodel. 
 
Here Figure 6 
 
4. Short-run dynamics in the abnormal case: the omnipotence of shareholders 
In this section we put forward an alternative explanation of the propensity to invest 
contained in well-known Post-Keynesian models such as Delli Gatti, Gallegati and Gardini 
(1993). Note that our aim is not to question these contributions but rather to extend them by 
introducing the destabilizing impact of shareholders with short-term plans, leading to 
abnormal values of the propensity to invest and to abnormal economic situations. Then, we 
assume the following causal mechanism for β : 
tu21 βββ −=                                                           (15) 
with .02,1 >=iβ  First, expression (15) seems rather strange since it indicates that a rise in the 
rate of capacity utilization causes a fall in the propensity to invest. This apparent paradox is 
easily explained by incorporating, as we said above, the presence of stockholders represented 
by institutions like banks or pension funds. The rationale is that shareholders may refuse the 
investment policy needed to respond to a rise in output because it threatens the profitability of 
their assets in the short-run. For example, the decision to invest may perfectly involve an 
 10 
immediate and prolonged rise in the retention rate, to ensure safe growth through larger 
internal funds. This is unacceptable for shareholders with short-term views since it would 
mechanically diminish the amount of their dividends. In a financial capitalist economy, the 
primacy of stockholders is such that they have the capability to ask for abnormal requests; 
postponing accumulation projects is obviously one of them. We think that such a situation, 
though corresponding to a particular case, cannot be eliminated from the analysis. Therefore, 
the existence of omnipotent shareholders explains why an increase in the rate of capacity 
utilization may lead to a fall in the propensity to invest. This is what we shall designate as our 
abnormal case. Note that our proposition may also be seen as a first attempt to formalize one 
of the possible cases of discord between stockholders and managers as extensively developed 
by the study of Crotty (1990). 
Turning our attention to formalization, the only logical constraint is to keep .1~ ≤u  For 
0=β  the rate of capacity reaches is maximum value, assuming 21 ββ ≤  ensures that we 
respect the above condition. A sudden change in shareholder behaviours may be captured 
through a variation in the parameter .2β  Thus, it is shown that an increment in 2β  moves the 
curve down, indicating that, for an unchanged level of capacity, managers yield to shareholder 
demands. In that case, they accept to decrease their propensity to invest and to completely 
revise their investment plans. For abnormal demands from shareholders a very risky situation 
appears as shown by the curve β ′′′  (see Figure 7). Indeed, a negative propensity to invest 
corresponds to a very abnormal situation in which firms utilize their retained earnings to buy 
financial assets instead of investing. 
 
Here Figure 7 
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Having presented the behaviour of shareholders with regard to profits, we may now turn 
back to our short-run dynamics in order to assess their impact on this Kaleckian economy. 
Now, introducing equation (15) into (10) we find a non linear first order difference equation 
of the form: 
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and .0,0 12,0 <
>>
=
εε i  Some simple calculations show that equation (16) is a parabolic curve in 
the plan with a positive inflexion point 21 2/)1( εε+=u (see Figure 8): 
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Equation (16) has two solutions: 
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Here Figure 8 
 
For a non linear difference equation, the stability of equilibrium requires (see the appendix) 
the inequality .1)~(/ 11 <∂∂ ++ uuu tt  Ignoring ,0~ <′′u  this gives: .11421 20211 <+++<− εεεε  
Since there still exists an indeterminacy concerning the previous inequality, we need to 
perform some numerical simulations to find the short-run dynamics of this neo-Kaleckian 
macromodel. In what follows, we shall focus on an increasing impact – in the sense of more 
pressures – of shareholders on managers, through a rise in the parameter .2β  Then, we assign 
the following values for the model’s parameters. 
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Here Table 3 
 
In addition, we choose the initial condition .2.00 =u  Figure 9 shows that equilibrium is stable 
around 86.0~ =u  and exogenous shocks do not affect the short-run economic equilibrium. A 
sufficiently low level of 2β  indicates that shareholder demands remain in reasonable limits, 
keeping the aggregate propensity to invest, ,β  positive and high enough to have a significant 
level of investment spending. 
 
Here Figure 9 
 
Assuming an increase in the parameter 2β  to 10.0, meaning that firms’ managers yield to 
shareholder requests, by diminishing their accumulation plans, leads to a two-period cycle 
(see Figure 10). Therefore, our first result underlines that, all else being constant, when 
stockholders ask for less investment this generates both persistent cycles and a recession, 
though the propensity to invest remains positive. 
 
Here Figure 10 
 
As shareholders demand stronger investment cut this generates an abnormal economic 
situation in which the propensity to invest becomes negative, firms utilizing profits to buy 
financial assets. This abnormal situation, undermining the real sector, is represented by the 
appearance of a larger instability (Figure 11). 
 
Here Figure 11 
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Here Figure 12 
 
Nevertheless, it is only when 2β  goes beyond a crucial value that the rate of capacity 
utilization follows a true chaotic motion.(1) For instance, with ,0.172 =β  Figure 12 clearly 
emphasizes that the series is aperiodic. The second result obtained here is that omnipotent 
shareholders may also be at the origin of chaos, by constraining managers to adopt abnormal 
behaviours regarding their natural propensity to invest. More generally, by putting pressure on 
managers, they create a very risky economic situation in the short-term in which firms 
diminish the level of needed investment to abnormal levels. This kind of configuration is 
likely to appear simply because stockholders have very short-term planning horizons as 
recalled by Crotty (1990). Indeed, they are not concerned with the concepts of investment 
policy, long-term growth and safety of the firm. Consequently, the reason why shareholders 
may destabilize a capitalist economy, even in the short-run, is because they have the 
capability to influence investment decisions in the wrong way. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this article we first deal with a short-run Kaleckian macromodel in which the propensity 
to invest is exogenous. We recall the main characteristics regarding the stability of 
equilibrium and some comparative static results, showing the effect of various parameters 
(such as interest rates, animal spirits and capitalists’ propensity to save out of profits) on the 
rate of capacity utilization. 
Then, we take into account an endogenous propensity to invest and examine to what extent 
this assumption modifies economic dynamics. We establish that when firms’ managers adopt 
abnormal behaviours, due to pressures from shareholders asking for unreasonable cuts in 
investment spending, the system loses its stability making room for persistent cycles and 
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chaotic trajectories even in the short-run. In consequence, our contribution is an illustration of 
how stockholders (and institutions that own portfolios) may be destabilizing for a financial 
capitalist economy. 
 
Appendix 
Consider the non linear difference equation (see Shone, 2002): 
)(1 tt xfx =+  
An equilibrium point exists if: x* = f (x*). To show the stability properties of the equilibrium 
point we take a Taylor expansion of f about x*. Ignoring the remainder term a first-order 
linear approximation gives: 
*)(/*)( 1*1 xxxfxfx txt −∂∂+= ++  
This procedure reduces the issue of stability to the study of a linear relation. Then, if: 
                                                   1/
*)( <∂∂ xxf   x* is stable 
                                                   1/
*)( >∂∂ xxf   x* is unstable 
                                                   1/
*)( =∂∂ xxf   the stability of x* is inconclusive 
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Footnotes 
 
(1) For a complete view of chaos in economics see Benhabib (1992) and Day (1994). 
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Figure 1: Stable fixed point for the rate of capacity use 
 
 
Figure 2: An increase in the capitalists’ propensity to save 
 
 
Table 1: Impact of changes in some parameters   
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Figure 3: The utilization curve in the normal case 
 
 
 
Table 2: Parameters for the normal case 
Parameters α  i  d  pi  0β  fs  cs  
Value 0.2 0.05 0.1 0.45 0.6 0.7 0.8 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Initial equilibrium with u0=0.2 
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Figure 5: A decrease in the capitalists’ propensity to save 
 
 
Figure 6: A decrease in the propensity to invest 
 
 
Figure 7: Shareholder behaviours regarding capacity 
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Figure 8: The utilization curve in the abnormal case 
 
 
 
Table 3: Parameters for the abnormal case 
Parameters α  i  d  pi  1β  2β  fs  cs  
Value 0.2 0.05 0.3 0.47 5.5 5.6 0.8 0.9 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Cyclical convergence with β2 = 5.6 
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Figure 10: Two-period cycle with β2 = 10.0 
 
 
Figure 11: Four-period cycle with β2 = 14.0 
 
 
Figure 12: Chaotic dynamics with β2 = 17.0 
 
